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I. The Need for Judicial Reform
A judicial system is a necessary component of the state machinery to rule the country. It
can be defined as an "entire network of courts in a particular jurisdiction."' The word
"judiciary" may carry a broader meaning when it refers to a "judicial system," as it means
the branch of government invested with the judicial power that can interpret, construe, and
apply the law.2 There are two different views in China about the definition of "judicial
system." One defines it as the system comprised of (1) the People's Court, (2) People's
Procuratorate, (3) the public security organ and judicial administrative organ, and (4) their
function of judicial enforcement2 The other narrows it to only include the organization
and activities of the court and the procuratorate. 4 The scope of this article is limited to
judicial reform relating to the court and the procuratorate. However, such a limitation does
not mean that this author endorses the narrower definition of the judicial system. Rather,
based on the practical circumstances of China's legal system, the definition of judicial system
should be broadly written.
Judicial reform is part of the overall legal reform in China.5 As early as December 1978,
the year when the monumental economic reform started, the communiqu6 of the Third
Plenary Session of the 11 th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
set forth the goals of rebuilding China's legal system, which was fundamentally damaged
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). It stated:
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to safeguard people's democracy, it is imperative to strengthen the socialist legal system so that
democracy is systematised and written into law in such a way as to ensure the stability, conti-
nuity, and full authority of this democratic system and these laws; there must be laws for people
to follow, these laws must be observed, their enforcement must be strict, and law breakers
must be dealt with.
From now on, legislative work should have an important place on the agenda of the National
People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee. Procuratorial and judicial organisations
must maintain their independence as is appropriate; they must faithfully abide by the laws,
rules, and regulations, serve the people's interests, and keep to the facts; they must guarantee
the equality of all people before the people's laws and deny anyone the privilege of being above
the law.'
These statements have since become the guidelines to re-establish the legal system as well
as to reform the judicial system.
Judicial reform is an actual need resulting from the dramatic changes in Chinese society
during the last two decades of economic reform and openness to the outside world. The
old judicial system was unable to cope with the changed situation, but modern society
expected a high quality and efficient judicial system. A number of challenges face China's
judicial system. Its two main challenges result from the requirement of the rule of law,
particularly when China recognized the importance of the rule of law in its Constitution
in 1999, and from the requirement of globalization, particularly with China's entry into the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001.
The first time China expressed the term "rule of law" in a legal form was in the 1999
Third Amendment to the 1982 Constitution. Accordingly, China pledged to "implement
law to govern the State and construct the socialist country with the rule of law."' People
may wonder what the rule of law is in the Chinese context. There are various definitions
of it,' but according to China's perception of the rule of law, at least for the current moment,
it is understood as the following explanations made by Jiang Zemin in his Report to the
15th CCP National Congress in 1997:
[T]he development of democracy must combine the improvement of the legal system so as to
govern the country by law. To govern the country by law means to manage the state affairs,
economic and social affairs by the people under the leadership of the Party in accordance with
the Constitution and law stipulations through various ways and forms. It should be guaranteed
that all the work in the state is carried out under the law. Institutionalization and legalization
6. Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (Oct.-Dec. 1978), CHINA Q. No. 77, Mar. 1979, at 172.
7. P.R.C. Const. art. 5. For a detailed analysis of the 1999 Amendment, see Zou Keyuan & ZhengYongnian,
China's Third Constitutional Amendment: A Leap Forward towards Rule of Law in China, Y.B. L. & LEGAL PRAc.
IN EAST ASIA, vol. 4, 29-41 (1999).
8. For example, according to Jennings, the rule of law is "an attitude, an expression of liberal and democratic
principles." ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & AJ. THOMAS, JR., A WORLD RULE OF LAW 4 (Dallas: SMU Press,
1975). Michael's definition of the rule of law is:
Rule of law is the very foundation of human rights. In the Western legal tradition, law is applied equally
to all; it is binding on the lawgiver and is meant to prevent arbitrary action by the ruler. Law guarantees
a realm of freedom for the members of a political community that is essential to the protection of life
and human dignity against tyrannical oppression and to the regulation of human relations within the
community.
Franz Michael, Law: A Tool of Power, in HUMAN RIGHTs IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 33 (Yuan-li Wu
et al. eds., 1988).
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of the socialist democracy should be progressively achieved so that the institution and the law
will not be changed because of the change of the leadership and because of the change of views
and attention of the leadership.'
It is said that the nature of the rule of law is the institutionalization and legalization
of the system in which the people are the master. In a rule of law society, the law should
be adopted through a democratic process and reflect the will of the majority of the
society.' 0
Nevertheless, President Jiang Zemin recently put forward a doctrine of so-called "rule
by virtue" (yide zhiguo) in parallel to the rule of law, and wanted the CCP to govern the
country by combining the rule of law with the rule by virtue." Virtue, linked with the
Confucian classics, can help prevent and curb corruption, including judicial corruption.
Some courts began to implement the so-called "rule the court by virtue" (yide zhiyuan). 12
At present, there is no doubt that party policy continues to be guiding principles for the
work of the court and the procuratorate. This is manifested by a recent call from Xiao Yang,
requesting that court personnel study Jiang Zemin's "three represents" carefully so as to
improve the quality of the law enforcement.
13
While Jiang's doctrine is recommended by many scholars,14 there may be a negative
potential that too much emphasis on the rule by virtue would endanger the implementation
of the rule of law since the term "rule by virtue" contains a strong colour of "rule by man."
It requires rule by virtuous people, which could be seen to place emphasis on the personality
of leaders rather than on the rule of law.'" Recent cases have shown that the CCP is still
disregarding the rule of law and allows political will to dominate their decisions (for ex-
ample, the spy plane crash in April 2001, the Gao Zhan case, and the Lai Changxing case).16-
9. Jiang Zemin, Hold High the Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-round Advancement of the Cause of
Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21st Century, Report delivered at the 15th National Con-
gress of the Communist Party of China on Sept. 12, 1997, BEUING REVIEW, Oct. 6-12, 1997, at 24.
10. Zhang Wangsheng & A Xi, Grasping the Meaning of 'the Rule of Law'Accurately, CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE,
1998, No. 5, at 4 (in Chinese).
11. On January 10, 2001, at a meeting with officials in charge of propaganda, Jiang highlighted the concept
of rule by virtue.
12. For example, there is a report on the court of Xingdu County of Sichuan Province. See Xie Meikun &
Chen Xiaoyu, Actively Explore the New Ways of 'Rule the Court by Virtue', PEOPLE'S COURT NEWSPAPER, June 9,
2001, available at http://www.china-judge.com/sfgg/sfgg4l0.htm (last visited June 15, 2001) (in Chinese).
13. See PEOPLE'S DAILY, Aug. 1, 2001, at 2 (in Chinese). The "three represents" refer to Jiang's recent
doctrine that the CCP should represent the advanced productive forces of the society, an advanced culture,
and the interest of the majority of the Chinese people.
14. For example, rule by virtue can guide the behaviour of judicial personnel. See Qiao Xingsheng, Rela-
tionship between 'Govern the Country by Virtue' and 'Govern the Country by Law' and Its Significance, ECONOMYAND
L., Apr. 2001 (Serial No. 96), at 46 (in Chinese). For further reference, see Hao Tiechuan, On Governing the
Country According to Law and by Virtue, SOCIAL SCIENCES, SHANGHAI ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, No. 4, 2-4
(2001) (in Chinese).
15. Tony Lau, Jiang's Appeal to Virtue Harks Back to Confucius, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 20,2001,
at 8.
16. If the CCP or the Chinese government had enough legal consciousness, it should submit the crash case
to the International Court of Justice for settlement. The late event proved that China lost face as well as
substance in dealing with this case. For the Gao Zhan case, if Gao was not a spy, she should not be subjected
to criminal trial, if she was a spy, she should not be released just one day after her sentencing. The Communist
leadership thereby totally disregarded China's law and judiciary. In the Lai Changxing case, Zhu Rongji had
no authority to promise that Lao would not be sentenced to death. Whether there is a death penalty or not
fully depends on the decision to be made by a court. According to the Chinese criminal procedure law, no one
is guilty until proved so that the presumption of innocence applies.
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From these events, people have reason to doubt whether the judicial reform could be carried
on smoothly.
Furthermore, two tendencies are unfavorable for the establishment of the rule of law in
China: (1) a hasty mood defined as the desire to reach the stage of the rule of law overnight;
and (2) the despair that implementing the rule of law in China is impossible because of the
past, bitter, lawless experiences. The problem here is how to perceive the rule of law phe-
nomenon in China. A rational approach tells us that we should take an optimistic attitude
towards the establishment of the rule of law, which needs time and effort, and it is a process
rather than an overnight achievement. For more than two decades "China has become more
deeply involved in a qualitative process of legal change rooted in the domestic necessities
of changing society and politics.""7 The argument that the rule of law is only an illusion or
wishful thinking contradicts the reality of the post-Mao legal system and misinterprets the
nature of post-Mao legal changes and reforms." It is hard to agree with the conclusion that
there has been no substantial change in China's legal system after more than twenty years
of legal reform and building-up, even with the incorporation of the rule of law conception
into the Constitution. However, China has a distance to go before reaching the goal of the
rule of law. Even if China has reached some degree of the rule of law, some elements such
as "an independent judiciary, an independent private bar, and the special public law juris-
dictions for review of administrative action and the constitutionality of legislation" are
necessary for implementing the rule of law."' Judicial reform is simply a response to the
requirement or challenge from the rule of law.
Second, with the increasing integration of China's economy into the global market, Chi-
nese laws and regulations have to keep in line with international legal norms and rules.
China's WNTO entry will bring a big challenge to the Chinese judiciary, which will force
China to deepen its judicial reform. 0 As observed by foreigners, China's legal system is
inadequate for the needs of foreign companies trying to do business there, and the volume
of business. Therefore the likely number of commercial disputes is growing well beyond
the judicial system's capacity. There are three obstacles: (1) the fact that the CCP remains
supreme in China, not the law; (2) lack of trained judges; and (3) corruption.2' The current
judicial reform aims to remedy the above inadequacies. According to one commentator,
"China's economy will not mature until there is a judicial system that produces a modicum
of accountability among government and party officials. ' '22 In this sense, China's WVTO
entry can produce a very positive impact on the development of the judicial reform and
China's road toward rule of law. On the other hand, the development of the market econ-
omy depends on a sound judicial system.
Before the economic reform, the court had mainly two functions: (1) punishing the en-
emy; and (2) dealing with family matters such as divorce. Nevertheless, since the economic
reform the court has been deeply involved in economic development. With the development
17. RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAw 5 (1994).
18. See Sujian Guo, Post-Mao China: The Rule of Law? ISSUES AND STUDIES, vol. 35(6), 1999, 80-108.
19. See John Reitz, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Theoretical Perspectives, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND
POST-COMMUNISM 135 (Robert D. Grey ed., 1997).
20. Chinese scholars began to discuss the impact of the WTO entry on the judicial reform. See, e.g., Guan
Baoquan, WTO Entry and Innovation of China's Judge System, PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE, No. 12, 2000, at 29-32 (in
Chinese).
21. Asian Legal System Inadequacies, ASIAN INTELLIGENCE, No. 585, May 30, 2001, at 5.
22. Shai Oster, Jiang's Biggest Gamble, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 19, 2001, at 34.
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of the market economy, the judicial system can play a greater role. As predicted by Chinese
government officials, more cases relating to investment and trade and/or involving more
complicated legal issues will increase after China's entry into the VT033 As pledged, the
judiciary must ensure that its judicial work is of high quality, efficient, and impartial, both
procedurally and substantially in providing services for economic development and social
stability.24 In this context, judicial reform is a necessity.
In addition, it should be realized that judicial reform is a complex process involving
conflicts of interest and rights between legal and political systems (the CCP in particular),
between the judiciary and the government, and between ideology and technical aspect. For
that reason, the present article is only able to focus on some major issues such as judicial
independence, professional quality of the judicial personnel, and improvement of court
operations, corruption, and judicial supervision.
I. The Chinese Endeavours
After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China began es-
tablishing its own judicial system based on the communist ideology and the Soviet model.
Unlike the political structure of separation of powers (in which the judicial system is the
main system of adjudication), China's existing judicial system broadly composes the People's
Court, the People's Procuratorate, the Department of Public Security and the Department
of Justice, and other governmental departments having the function of judicial administra-
tion, such as the Ministry of State Security and the Notaries. Such broad composition may
cause confusion, but it is a reality in China. Some departments, such as the Department of
Public Security, hold far greater judicial power than the court and the procuratorate, though
the Department of Public Security is under the State Council."
Both the People's Court and the People's Procuratorate were founded in accordance
with the Chinese Constitution.26 The Court, as mandated by the Constitution, is the judicial
organ of the state, including the Supreme Court, courts at various local levels, military
courts, and other special courts such as maritime courts and railway transport courts. There
are four levels of the court system: (I) the Supreme Court, (2) the higher courts at the
provincial level (numbering thirty-one), (3) intermediate courts at the prefectural level
(numbering 389), and (4) primary courts at the county level (numbering 3,067). The Su-
preme Court,27 which is the highest judicial organ, supervises the administration of justice
by local and special courts. Courts of higher level supervise courts of lower level. The
23. See LIANHE ZAOBAO, Long Yongtu Predicts More Litigations During the Early Period of China's Entry into
WTO, July 14, 2001, at 26 (in Chinese).
24. See Opinions on Playing Fully the Role of Adjudication to Provide udicial Protection and Legal Services fir
Economic Development, SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT, Mar. 3, 2000, (cited injianfi ChenJudicialReform in China,
CCH's CHINA LAw UPDATE, May 2000, at 7).
25. There is a saying in China that "big public security, small court, and optional procuratorate" (dagongan,
xiao fayuan, keyou kewu jiancbayuan), see Cui Shixing, Make Firm the Basis of Just Law Enforcement, PEOPLE'S
DAILY, Mar. 28, 2001, at 10 (in Chinese).
26. P.R.C. Const. arts. 123-135 (1982), reprinted in Bureau of Legislative Affairs ofthe State Council ofthe
PRC, Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China Governing Foreign-Related Matters 299-300,
vol. 1 (1991).
27. The People's Supreme Court was established in October 1949 just after the founding of the PRC. See
JUDICIAL WORK OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA, vol. 1, 23-24 (He Lanjian & Lu Mingjian eds., 1993).
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Chinese courts whereby a case should be finally decided after two trials, the first by a lower
court, and then by a higher court when there is an appeal apply the two-level trial system.
In criminal cases, the procuratorate may present a protest to the higher court when it is
dissatisfied with the decision made by the lower court.
The Organic Law of the People's Courts guides the internal organization of the Court.2 8
Within each court, there are usually several divisions, such as civil, economic, criminal,
administrative, and enforcement. A court has one president and several vice presidents, and
a division has one chief and several associate chiefs. Each court also has a judicial committee
that is composed of the presidents, division chiefs, and experienced judges. The standing
committee of the people's congresses at the corresponding level appoints the members of
the committee. The judicial committee is the most authoritative body in a court, which is
responsible for discussing important or difficult cases, providing direction concerning other
judicial matters and reviewing and summing up judicial experiences. Its direction usually
guides judges and collegial panels in dealing with cases, particularly difficult and compli-
cated ones. For example, inside the Supreme Court, there are the Adjudicative Committee,
the Court Conference, and adjudicative divisions respectively in charge of cases of admin-
istrative matters, cases concerning communications and transport, economic cases, civil
cases, and criminal cases. Recently a new division in charge of maritime and foreign-related
cases was established within the Supreme Court.2 9 The Supreme Court can handle cases of
(1) first instance assigned by laws and decrees; (2) appeals and of protests lodged against
judgements and orders of higher people's courts and special people's courts; and (3) protests
lodged by the Supreme Procuratorate in accordance with the procedures of judicial inter-
pretation. 30 In addition, the Supreme Court has the power to interpret questions concerning
the application of specific laws and regulations in judicial proceedings.
According to the Chinese Constitution, the Procuratorate is the "State organ for legal
supervision." 31 Article 5 of the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates defines the
functions and powers of the procuratorates at all levels,3 and they have two main functions:
(1) legal supervision, and (2) public prosecution for criminal cases. The structure of the
28. Organic Law of the People's Court was promulgated in 1979 and amended in 1983. RONALD C. BROWN,
UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL PRocEsS: LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 150-157 (1997)
(English translation of Organic Law),
29. Supreme Court Newly Establish the Fourth Division of Civil Cases, CHINA OCEAN NEWS, Aug. 11, 2000 (in
Chinese).
30. Organic Law of the People's Courts, art. 32.
31. P.R.C. Const. art. 129.
32. They are to: (1) exercise procuratorial authority over cases of treason, cases involving acts to dismember
the state and other major criminal cases severely impeding the unified enforcement of state policies, laws,
decrees and administrative orders; (2) conduct investigation of criminal cases handled directly by themselves;
(3) review cases investigated by public security organs and determine whether to approve arrest, and prosecute
or to exempt from prosecution; (4) exercise supervision over the investigative activities of public securityorgans
to determine whether their activities conform to the law; (5) initiate public prosecutions of criminal cases and
support such prosecutions; (6) exercise supervision over the judicial activities of people's courts to ensure they
conform to the law; and (7) exercise supervision over the execution of judgments and orders in criminal cases
and over the activities of prisons, detention houses and organs in charge of transformation through labor to
ensure such executions and activities conform to the law. The Organic Law of the People's Procuratorate was
adopted in July 1979 and took effect as of I January 1980. English text is available in Legislative Affairs
Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China,
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 80-87 (1987).
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procuratorate is similar to that of the court.3 Though very similar in terms of organization,
there is a difference between the court and the procuratorate. According to the Constitu-
tion, within the judicial branch, the higher level courts supervise the work of the lower
courts and the courts at various levels are responsible to the respective people's congresses
that created them. But within the structure of the procuratorate, the higher procuratorates
direct the work of those at lower levels. The procuratorial organs at lower levels are re-
sponsible to both the corresponding people's congresses that created them and the people's
procuratorates at higher levels.
During the Cultural Revolution the judicial system was totally shattered. In 1968, Mao
Zedong is quoted as saying that China should "depend upon the rule of man, not the rule
of law," and courtrooms were condemned as "bastions of bourgeois justice. '34 After Mao's
era, the judicial system was re-established with the construction process of the Chinese legal
system. However, judicial reform lagged behind in comparison with the legal reform in
other areas, such as legislation. The judicial reform in the 1980s focused mainly on training
judges, most of whom were retired military servicemen. Only recently has China realized
that it is necessary to carry on a large-scale judicial reform so as to improve the enforcement
of its laws and regarded such reform as a major and necessary step towards the rule of law.
The major step was taken after Deng Xiaoping's southern China tour in 1992, which led
China towards the development of a market economy, catching-up with international stan-
dards. The fundamental change inevitably produced huge impacts on legal reform as well
as judicial reform. In 1995 China enacted its laws on judges and on procurators. The
purpose of the enactment was to professionalize the judicial personnel. The Judge's Law
carries the objective of ensuring that "people's courts independently exercise their judicial
authority in accordance with the law; judges carry out their duties in accordance with the
law; judges' quality is upgraded; and scientific control over judges is implemented."" The
Procurator's Law has a similar objective for the procuratorate and its personnel.16
Based on the previous achievements, judicial reform marched forward significantly in
October 1999 when the Supreme People's Court prepared and distributed the Five-Year
Reform Programme of the People's Courts to the courts at all levels to implement. The
Reform Programme set forth the aims for the period from 1999 to 2003: (1) to further
deepen the reform of adjudicating forms centred on the principle of open trial; (2) to
establish the adjudicating management mechanism focusing on strengthening the respon-
sibility of judges and the collegiate bench; (3) to reform the internal institutions of the
courts and reasonably equip adjudicating personnel and judicial administrative personnel;
(4) to establish a highly qualified team of judges; (5) to modernize the office of the courts
and improve the efficiency of adjudicating work and the level of management; (6) to improve
the supervisory mechanisms safeguarding the fairness and integrity of the judicial personnel;
33. The Supreme Procuratorate is the highest, and the local procuratorates are divided into three levels and
include procuratorates at the provincial level; branches of the procuratorates in prefectures and cities directly
under the provincial governments; and procuratorates of counties, cities, autonomous counties, and municipal
districts. Procuratorial committees are created inside the procuratorates at different levels. Procuratorates at
all levels shall have a chief procurator, a number of deputy chief procurators and procurators. The chief
procurators exercise unified leadership over the work of the procuratorates. The term of office of the chief
procurators shall be the same as that of the People's Congresses at corresponding levels.
34. See JAsPER BECKER, THE CHINESE 326 (2000).
35. Judge's Law, art. 1.
36. See Procurator's Law, art. 1.
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and (7) to explore the reforms of the organizational system of the courts, the management
system of the court cadres, and the management system of the courts' funds.
For the purpose of safeguarding judicial fairness and integrity, the Reform Programme
stressed the importance of establishing an internal check-and-balance mechanism to
strengthen the adjudicating supervisory system by implementing the (Trial) Measures in
Dealing with the Liability of the Adjudicating Personnel of the People's Courts for Vio-
lations of Laws in Adjudication and the (Trial) Measures on Adjudicating Disciplinary Pun-
ishment of the People's Courts. They also improved the inspectors system. 7 As part of the
Reform Programme, the Certain Opinions on Strengthening the Grass-roots Construction
of the People's Courts were issued in 2000.38
Likewise, the Supreme Procuratorate in January 2000 adopted the Implementing Opin-
ions of the Three-Year Procuratorial Reform. Accordingly, from 2000 onward, procura-
torates at all levels should carry out the case handling responsibility system under the re-
sponsibility of chief procurators. In addition, reform will be made for the prosecuratorial
working mechanism to reinforce the function of legal supervision; for institutional mech-
anisms to reinforce the direction of the lower procuratorates by the higher procuratorates;
for procuratorial personnel system to raise the quality of the procurators and other per-
sonnel working in the procuratorates; for internal and external supervisory mechanisms to
safeguard justice, honesty and high efficiency; and for financial management systems to
provide the procuratorates with material security.39
II. Judicial Independence
The aims set forth in the Reform Programme require great effort and commitment from
the CCP and the Chinese government. The most important issue for successful judicial
reform should be the realization of judicial independence. It is generally acknowledged, "an
independent judiciary is the best means for protecting the rule of law."4 The goal of the
rule of law requires "the development of a judicial system that is relatively autonomous of
the executive and legislative powers of government."'4' Judicial independence is an essential
element of the "separation of powers" in the western liberal notion. It is "an essential aspect
of democratic government following on necessarily from the essential presence of judicial
power within the powers of the state;" it "allows for a system of mutual checks and balances
against the excesses of one branch of government;" and it "ensures that judges are free to
do justice in their communities." 2 According to the standards adopted by the International
37. See Circular of the Supreme People's Court Regarding the Print and Distribution of Five-Year Reform Pro-
gramme of the People's Courts, in GAZEr'E OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(in Chinese) No. 6, at 185-190 (1999).
38. LEGAL DAILY, Aug. 14, 2000 (in Chinese).
39. LEGAL DAILY, Feb. 23, 2000 (in Chinese).
40. See Michael Herz, Rediscovering Francis Lieber: An Afterword and Introduction, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2107,
2133 (1995). Other jurists concur with this view. See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Rule of Law and theAge ofAquarius,
41 HASTINGS L. J., 757, 760 (1990) (quoting Geoffrey de Q. Walker for the proposition that "an independent
judiciary is an indispensable requirement of the rule of law"); Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge:
Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 625, 631 (1999) (arguing that "an independent judiciary"
is a "necessity" for the rule of law).
41. Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 99 (2001).
42. Mark Findlay, 'Independence' and the Judiciary in the PRC: Expectations for Constitutional Legality in China,
LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 297 (KanishkaJayasuriya
ed., 1999).
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Bar Association, judicial independence comprises personal independence (adequate guar-
antee that judges are not subject to executive control, adequate salaries and pensions, and
job security), substantive independence (a judge is subject to nothing but the law and com-
mands of his conscience), internal independence (a judge is independent vis-a-vis his judicial
colleagues and superiors in the decision-making process), and collective independence (the
judiciary as a whole enjoys autonomy vis-a-vis the executive).43
China has attempted to make the judiciary work independently within the stipulation in
the Chinese Constitution that "the people's courts exercise judicial power independently,
in accordance with the provisions of the law, and are not subject to interference by any
administrative organ, public organisation or individual.""4 Such independence was reaf-
firmed in the Organic Law of the People's Courts.41 It allows the courts to exercise state
judicial power independently, free from interference from any organizations or individuals,
including the CCP and its members.
According to a scholarly explanation, the word "court" contained in the above stipulation
is of pivotal importance and it means that the individual judges do not have the judicial
power, but the courts where the judges perform their duties do. The collegial panels are
the trial units, not the individual judges, and the judgments by the collegial panels are made
in the name of the courts. Therefore, the independent power of adjudication is vested in
courts and not in judges." In this sense, only the collective independence is realized. Because
of this collectiveness, in practice, presidents and/or division chiefs have the power to review
and suggest changes in draft judgments prepared by collegial panels, thus constituting an
internal interference with the independent adjudication of collegial panels. 47 Thus, this
independence is not the one that is generally accepted.
A. OTHER BARRIERS TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
It is generally understood that judicial independence means to a great extent the inde-
pendence of the judges in handling cases. However, in China, judicial personnel are actually
nominated and appointed by people's congresses at the corresponding level. Furthermore,
budgets of the courts are also decided and provided by governments at the corresponding
levels. Therefore, it is hard for judicial personnel to ward off the influence of the admin-
istrative organs.4s Interference often occurs when a court handles a case that involves in-
terests of a local government or a government department. A recent survey revealed that
43. See Yuwen Li, Judicial Independence: Applying International Minimum Standards to Chinese Law and Practice,
CHINA INFORMATION, VOI. 15(1), 68-70 (2001).
44. P.R.C. Const. art. 126, translated in LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA Gov-
ERNING FOREIGN-RELATED MATTERS 299 (1991).
45. Article 4 of the Organic Law provides that the courts should conduct adjudication independently and
subject only to the law, and shall not be interfered with by administrative organs, social organisations or
individuals. BROWN, supra note 28, at 151.
46. See "People's Courts," at http://www.chnlaw.com/LegalForum/Legalsystem/Courts/Courts.htm (last
visited June 29, 2001).
47. It is interesting to note that due to the poor quality of judges, some scholars believe that too much
emphasis on judicial independence would possibly exacerbate judicial corruption. See Guo Chunming & Liu
Zhigang, Judicial Justice: A Summarisation of the Seminar on the Goals of the Judicial Reform, CHINESE LEGAL
SCIENCE, No. 4, at 156 (2000) (P.R.C.) (in Chinese).
48. See Song Bing, Assessing China's System of Judicial Review ofAdministrativeActions,VIII1-2 CHINA L. REP.
17 (1994).
FALL 2002
1048 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
judges in China commonly confirmed the existence of the illegal interference, sometimes
serious, in judicial independence. 41 In a case reported in the People's Daily on interference
with judicial investigation: Zhao Yuming was a legal person representative for a branch
company of the Guiyang Chemical and Construction Company located in Dujun City,
Guizhou Province. He was suspected of embezzlement and subject to an arrest approved
by the Guiyang People's Procuratorate in December 2000. However, due to the interfer-
ence of the local government, the enforcement of the arrest warrant could not be carried
out.5 0 Because of the dependence on the local government for financial and other necessary
support, judges and/or courts, even knowing that some cases are not fairly handled, tend
to subordinate themselves to the instructions of the local government or party leaders."
Thus the independence of the Chinese judiciary is still limited and it may take a long time
to reach genuine judicial independence. What is more questionable for judicial indepen-
dence is the fact that China is still a one party rule regime, which is different from western
democracy.
The relationship between the judicial system and the CCP is a common topic in academia
as well as in mass media. Although the Chinese Constitution stipulates that "no organisation
or individual may enjoy the privilege of being above the Constitution and the law,' '5 2 the
CCP often interferes in judicial affairs as reported from time to time. The Political-Legal
Committee of the CCP is a very powerful organization, usually giving instructions to the
relevant courts addressing how to handle cases. The Political-Legal Committee has the
power to issue legal documents together with the Court and/or the Procuratorate. For
example, on March 29, 1983, the Political-Legal Committee of the Central Committee of
the Party, at the request of the Shaanxi Provincial Political-Legal Committee, issued a
ruling regarding the criteria for initiating prosecutions for corruption offences involving
less than RMB 2,000, which was officially circulated to all courts and procuratorates to
follow." Related to this is the so-called "double restraint" (shuanggu),5 4 a CCP internal
practice that usually applies to the high rank corrupt officials within the Party. Only if the
CCP Discipline Inspection Committee has determined that the case should be handed over
to the judiciary, can the latter be able to handle it. Many cases are digested within this
practice subject to Party disciplines, even if criminal acts are obvious and should be subject
to the penal code. This internal practice is criticized as "entirely arbitrary," and has indicated
that it is "improbable that China will move towards a depoliticised legal system as long as
the Party treats even its own members without reference to any legal process.""5 In addition,
49. See Gao Qicai et al., Procedure, Judges and Adjudicating Impartiality, CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, No. 8, at 9
(2000) (P.R.C.) (in Chinese).
50. According to Mayor of Dujun, the case should be handled by Dujun. See Behind the Unenforced Arrest of
a Criminal Suspect, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Aug. 2, 2001, at 4 (in Chinese).
51. See Cai Dingjian, Development of the Chinese Legal System Since 1979 and Its Current Crisis and Transfor-
mation, CULTURAL DYNAMICS, VOL. 11 (2), at 161 (1999).
52. P.R.C. Const. art. 5, § 4.
53. See Anthony R. Dicks, Compartmentalized Law and Judicial Restraint: An Inductive View of SomeJurisdic-
tional Barriers to Reform, CHINA Q. No. 141, at 97 (1995).
54. It refers to the practice that a suspected corrupt official must report within the prescribed time and at
the prescribed location to the Party Discipline Inspection Committee during the preliminary investigation
prior to the intervention of the judiciary.
55. BECKER, supra note 34, at 340.
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it is noted that most of the court cadres are CCP members 6 and they are usually inclined
to obey the Party decisions or policies when they decide on cases, particularly those that
contain political implications. It is commonly recognized that Party affiliation produces an
impact on a judge's decision. It occurs even in the United States where the separation of
powers is firmly established, as acknowledged "a judge's party affiliation may have a feed-
back reinforcement on his value system which in turn determines his decisional propensi-
ties."" However, in China's case, the impact of the party affiliation is extremely salient.
Some of such impact may be attributed to the Chinese Constitution itself: on one hand, it
affirms the judicial independence, but on the other, it also expressly provides that all and
anyone in China should follow four basic cardinal principles." Since judicial independence
is within the ambit of law, the court and the procuratorate must fulfill the above constitu-
tional requirement when they handle cases.
The above provisions in the Constitution on judicial independence seem to conflict with
other provisions contained in the Constitution as "[the Party] must see to it that the leg-
islative, judicial and administrative organs of the State and the economic, cultural and peo-
ple's organizations work actively and with initiative, independently, responsibly and in har-
mony."59 It is pointed out, "If the Party is subject to the state's laws, it cannot legitimately
supervise the State as a lawmaking body. '60 "When contradictions between Party policy
and law exist, it is not clear whether such contradictions will be resolved by following the
Party policy, the law, or handling them on a case-by-case basis." t6 American scholars anal-
ogize the relationship between Party policy decisions and state legal norms in some respects
to the relationship between equity and the common law:
Just as equity provides a gloss on the common law, Party decisions provide a gloss on State
legal norms. But just as a rule of common law must give way when it conflicts with a principle
of equity, so must any rule of state law give way when it is inconsistent with an ideological
principle of the Party.
62
While we admit that the Party has a great influence over the legal system, we should realize
that with the economic reform and the development of the legal system per se such influence
may be weakened, particularly when the rule of law has been put into the Constitution. It
is admitted, "Today Chinese courts and law are much less politicized than any time since
the PRC was founded. '63 Currently, the political and legal impact resulting from the current
on-going judicial reforms could further weaken the negative Party influence. As early as
1979, the Central Committee of the CCP issued the Instruction on Strictly Implementing
56. A recent official report acknowledged that 95 percent of judges and other legal administrators are Party
members who are carefully selected for being politically loyal to the Party line. See Xin Ren, TRADITION OF
THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADITION: LAW, STATE AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINA 60 (1997).
57. Stuart S. Nagel, The Relationship Between the Political and Ethnic Affiliation of Judges, and Their Decision-
Making, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH (Glendon Schubert ed., 1964), at 246.
58. The four basic cardinal principles are: (1) leadership of the CCP; (2) adherence to Marxism, Leninism,
and Mao Zedong Thought; (3) adherence to the people's democratic dictatorship; and (4) adherence to the
socialist road. See P.R.C. Const. at preamble, availahe at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ch00000_-html(last
visited Aug. 12, 2002).
59. RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., LAW AND POLITICS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 91-92 (1992).
60. Id. at 91-92.
61. Id. at 91-92.
62. Id. at 92-93.
63. STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRO IN A CAGE: LEGA. REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 295 (1999).
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the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, according to which the system of review
and approval of the cases by the Party Committee should be annulled. 4 Unfortunately, in
practice, the influence of the CCP over China's judiciary is still great.
B. CHINA SHOULD STRIVE FOR U.N. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS
Since China has pledged to follow the international rules and standards to build its own
legal system, it should consider absorbing general judicial principles and rules into its ju-
dicial reform.61 The United Nations has adopted a series of political and legal documents
guiding the development and improvement of its member states' judicial systems. The most
important one is the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,66 which set forth
the rules and standards for the independence of the judiciary and the qualifications of the
judges. In terms of judicial independence, it stipulates that:
I. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the
Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other insti-
tutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.
2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in
accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pres-
sures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclu-
sive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence
as defined by law.
4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process,
nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without
prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of
sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law.
5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established
legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal
process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or
judicial tribunals.
6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to
ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are
respected.
7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary
to properly perform its functions. 67
It is clear that a number of defects in China's political and judicial systems negatively
affect judicial independence, in addition to the interference from the CCP. Compared to
the U.N. standards, the Chinese way towards a full realization of judicial independence is
64. See Jiang Huiling, Judicial Procedure and Judicial Reform, PEOPLE'S JuDIcATrURE, No. 7, at 24 (1999)
(P.R.C.) (in Chinese).
65. The Chinese like to use the jargon "getting on the track with the international community" (gen guoji
iegui).
66. It was adopted by the 7th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders held in Milan from August 26 to September 6 1985 and endorsed by the Seventh United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, G.A. Res. 40/32, U.N. GAOR, 96th plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/32 (1985) and Human Rights in the Administration ofJustice, G.A. Res. 40/146, U.N.
GAOR, 116th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/146 (1985).
67. Id. 1 1-7. See Principles 1-7 of the Basic Principles, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
h_comp50.htm (last visited July 2, 2001).
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a long march. Only when China closely follows the U.N. standards will it realize full judicial
independence.
IV. Professional Quality and Court Efficiency
How to cherish the quality of judges and other judicial personnel is an unavoidable issue
that the process of judicial reform faces. The initial personnel of the PRC courts were
retired military servicemen. Even today, many such personnel staff the courts, particularly
local courts. According to a 1997 statistic, among 250,000 court cadres, those who hold a
bachelors degree account for only 5.6 percent and those who hold a masters degree account
for 0.25 percent.66 At present, there are about 280,000 adjudicating personnel throughout
the country, but the actual number of qualified judges is small. 9 Largely due to the poor
quality of judges, mishandled cases have been reported frequently. For instance, in Heilo-
ngjiang Province between 1993 and 1996, sentences given in 438 court cases were found
to be erroneous and 460 judicial officials were punished for malpractice. 0
The problem is exacerbated by the current phenomenon that graduates from law schools
who are willing to work at the judiciary cannot be properly recruited by the court or the
procuratorate, while laid off employees from the governmental departments work in the
court.71 Under such circumstances, it is extremely difficult to improve the professional
quality of judges and procurators despite the efforts made. It is also interesting that the
criticism of the recruitment of retired military servicemen to be judges brought rebuke
from the military side asking why they cannot become judges."
A. THE LAW OF JUDGES
The Law of Judges is the first legislation to govern the system of judges, and it contains
a number of principles which include: (1) competition in selection and employment of
judges, (2) merit measured on performance, (3) integrity and ability in the discharge of
judicial functions, and (4) the administration of judicial functions according to law." The
Law identifies obligations and rights for judges. Its counterpart law for the personnel of
the procuratorate is the Law of Procurators that was promulgated in 1995 and contains
similar provisions. 4
The provisions on the qualifications of judges in the Law of Judges cannot be fully
implemented, particularly in the local courts due to various interferences as well as the
loophole of flexibility within the law. For that reason, the NPC decided to amend these
two laws in July 2000. The two draft amendments were designed to improve the quality of
68. See TAN SIoU (ed.), STUDY ON CHINA'S JUDICIAL REFORM 23 (2000) (in Chinese).
69. See Li Hanchang, A Perspective of Judges' Quality and Training against the Background of Judicial System
Reform, CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 2000, No. 1, 48-49 (in Chinese).
70. Liu Junhai, Legal Reforms in China, GOVERNANCE, DECENTRALIZATION AND REFORM IN CHINA, INDIA AND
RUSSIA 395 (ean Jacques Dethier ed. 2000).
71. See How China'sJudiciary Faces the New Century, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL SYSTEM MONTHLY (in Chinese),
No. 2, 2000, at 80.
72. See Yi Yanyou, A BibliographicalNote on Judicial Reform Studies, 12(6) PEKING UNv. LJ. 749 (2000).
73. The text is reprinted in COMPENDIUM OF THE CURRENT LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 132-
140 (Peng Liming ed., 1998), 132-140 (in Chinese).
74. Id. at 140-148.
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the judiciary by raising qualification standards. According to the amendments, those who
are appointed judges or procurators must be college graduates who have practiced law for
at least two years, or must be post-graduates who have practiced law for at least one year.
Those who did not major in law must be confirmed as having the same level of knowledge
of the law." The new amendments were adopted in June 2001 and entered into effect as
of January 1, 2002. They are hailed as playing an important role in strengthening the
calibre of China's judiciary, ensuring that justice be served, and dramatically lifting the
benchmark for those entering the legal professions.16 It is the first time that the amended
Law of Judges provided that the president and vice-president of a people's court should be
chosen from judges or those with backgrounds of legal practice for their merit."
In accordance with the amended laws and for the purpose of meeting the professional
requirements, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Justice
jointly issued a circular to unify the judicial examination for entry-level judges and procu-
rators as well as for the qualification of lawyers." The first such examination was held in
March 2002. This measure may improve the quality of judges and procurators, but it is not
clear why the examination for judges and procurators is combined with the existing bar
examination. In addition, the procuratorate prepared a training programme for procurators
from 2001 to 2005. Accordingly, by the end of 2005, 90 percent of the procurators should
have college diplomas, of whom about 100 should possess a Ph.D. degree, 4,000 a masters
degree, and 40 percent a bachelors degree."9 The court has intensified its training programs
by cooperating with the Law School of Peking University to carry on an online program
that trains judges to meet the qualifications set forth in the amended Judges' Law. 0 A recent
survey of judges in Beijing municipality proved that the educational level of the judges has
been raised: among 252 presiding judges and 329 sole judges surveyed, one has a Ph.D.,
twenty-five have Master's degrees, 307 have Bachelor's degrees, and 215 are junior college
graduates."I With China's entry into the WTO, educating judges on WTO rules has be-
come a pressing task. It is reported that the National Judges College started to provide
Chinese judges with a series of VTO-related training courses.8 2
75. See Amended Laws Raise Qualifications of Judges, BEIJING REvIEw, Aug. 7, 2000, at 6. For reference, see
Zhuang Huining, How to Revise the Laws of Judges and Prosecutors? OUTLOOK WEEKLY, July 24, 2000, at 26-27
(in Chinese).
76. Jiang Zhuqing, China Adopts Amendments to Laws on Judges, Prosecutors, CHINA DAILY, July 1, 2001.
77. Meng Yan, China's Legislature Examines 8 Draft Laws, CHINA DAILY, June 27, 2001. It should be noted
that even before the adoption of the amended laws, the new selection process first took place in Beijing in
March 2001, perhaps experimentally, through which a batch of 252 presiding judges (who oversee the operation
of a court) and 329 sole judges (who preside alone over simple cases) were selected. Presiding judges, formerly
appointed by the chief judge, or by the court president, or by the administrative official of a court division, are
selected via a two-way process that includes authorization from the court president and the chief judge of the
court division. See New Selection Process to Improve Judicial System, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 31, 2001 [hereinafterNew
Selection Process].
78. See id.; PEOPLE'S DAILY, July 16, 2001, at 2 (in Chinese).
79. Five-Year Education and Training Programme for Procuratorate, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Mar. 14, 2001, at 6 (in
Chinese). The court also has its training programme for the year of 2001 to 2005, see Xiao Yang, Work Report
of the Supreme People's Court, PEOPLE's DAILY, Mar. 22, 2001, at 2 (in Chinese).
80. See To Establish a ProfessionalJudge Team of High Quality, PEOPLE's DAILY, Nov. 13, 2001,at6(in Chinese).
81. New Selection Process, supra note 77.
82. Supreme Court Gets Readyfor WTO Entry, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 22, 2001. The whole text is available in
LEGAL DAILY, Oct. 22, 2001, at 4 (in Chinese).
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B. INCREASING PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
The judiciary also tries to heighten the standards of professional ethics for judges and
procurators. For instance, in October 2001 the Supreme Court issued a circular requiring
courts at all levels across China to improve judges' self-discipline and efficiency in accor-
dance with the Chinese Judges' Professional Ethics Principles including judicial justice
improvement, working efficiency acceleration, honesty, judicial management and self-
improvement.83 These regulations may be related to the U.N. guidelines for the judges'
qualifications, selection and training. The Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary adopted in 1985 requires, "Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals
of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of
judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. ' s4
They have the right to freedom of expression, but they should always conduct themselves
in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and inde-
pendence of the judiciary. Judges shall be free to form and join associations of judges or
other organizations to represent their interests, promote their professional training, and
protect their judicial independence. s5 In addition, the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors
are also an important reference for China's judicial reform."s
C. THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY AND EFFICIENCY IN ADJUDICATION
The other important aspect in judicial reform should be transparency and efficiency of
the court adjudication. It is recorded that China has 280,000 judges-the most of any
country in the world-but suffers a bad image for its judiciary's low efficiency of handling
cases.8 Recently open trials and hearings, except for those involving privacy, minors, or
state secrets, have been undertaken in big cities such as Beijing. All Chinese citizens who
intend to attend a court trial or hearing, and all the reporters who want to cover the trials
will have to apply to the court for valid identity certificates to hear cases. 8 Open trial is a
83. Ying Wang, See New Codes of Conduct for Judges, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 19, 2001.
84. See United Nations, supra note 66, 10. Principle 10 of the Basic Principles, available at http:/
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h-compS0.htm (last visited July 2, 2001).
85. See id. 8-9. Principles 8-9 of the Basic Principles, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3fb/
h_comp50.htm (last visited July 2 2001).
86. They require States to make sure that: selection criteria for prosecutors embody safeguards against
appointments based on partiality or prejudice, excluding any discrimination against a person on the grounds
of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, social or ethnic origin, property,
birth, economic or other status, except that it shall not be considered discriminatory to require a candidate for
prosecutorial office to be a national of the country concerned. Prosecutors have appropriate education and
training and should be made aware of the ideals and ethical duties of their office, of the constitutional and
statutory protections for the rights of the suspect and the victim, and of human rights and fundamental freedoms
recognized by national and international law. Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, art. 2, available at http:/
/www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h-comp45.htm (last visitedJuly 2,2001). Both were adopted by the 8th United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, August 27 to
September 7,1990.
87. How China's Judiciary Faces the New Century, DEMOCRACY ANO LEGAL SYSTEM MONTHLY, No. 2, 2000, at
80 (in Chinese).
88. Tang Min, Trails to Open to Public in Beiing, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 20, 1998. For the Beijing municipality,
there are three regulations governing this practice: (1) the Decision of Beijing Higher People's Court on
Implementing Public Trial at All Beijing Courts; (2) the Regulations on Citizens' Overhearing of Publicly
Tried Cases; and (3) the Regulations on Reporters' Overhearing of Publicly Tried Cases.
FALL 2002
1054 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
litigation principle that attempts to maximize the fairness and transparency of the judicial
system. It is commented, "The publicity of trials can have a far-reaching impact on ensuring
the integrity of the legal system, because it is the most direct, widespread, and forceful form
of oversight."89
Although open trial is a kind of procedure, it involves a number of key aspects of judicial
reform. It requires transparent and just court procedures and highly qualified judges. It also
requires the reform of the internal operation in the court, such as the review and approval
system of the adjudicative committee. Thus open trial, as part of judicial reform, can fa-
cilitate the overall judicial reform, and vice versa. However, the biggest problem in open
trial, as Xiao Yang, President of the Supreme People's Court once admitted, is the quality
of judges.9° In June 2000, the Supreme People's Court decided to make public verdict
documents that would be published in major media, court's publications, and/or on the
Internet. This would increase the credibility of court rulings and public trust in the judi-
ciary.9' This is another significant move towards the court's implementation of the open
trial system.
D. PROBLEMS WITH EFFICIENCY
The efficiency of the court work is a problem in law enforcement. Cases that have not
been handled, or handled but not yet enforced, have dramatically increased. According to
a high court statistic, the national incidence of un-enforced cases stands at 30 percent a
year. In some courts, the backlog of adjudicated but unresolved cases has risen to 60-70
percent of the annual caseload.92 In 2000 at a national meeting on civil trials, Xiao Yang
urged all the judges to enhance trial efficiency and handle cases in due time set by the law.
According to him, people were not satisfied with some aspects of court work and the ma-
jority of their complaints are centred on injustice and low efficiency in handling cases. For
the interest of the people, "cases that can be concluded in the remaining days of this year
should not be delayed to the 21st century."9 The efficiency of case handling has been
increased in recent years. One figure indicates that in 1989 with 120,000 adjudicating per-
sonnel, the number of closed cases was 3,182,194, accounting for 26.5 cases per person per
year; and in 1998 with 170,000 adjudicating personnel, the number of closed cases was
5,864,274, accounting for 34.5 cases per person per year. The amount of the closed cases
per person increased to 30.19 percent.94 However, despite improvements, the problem of
low efficiency still remains.
The issue of work efficiency also lies on the internal operation of the court, particularly
resulting from the mechanism of a judicial committee, which usually makes a final decision
89. Liu Junhai, supra note 70, at 397.
90. See Yang Zhejing and Cheng Xingsheng, Principle of Open Trial, PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE, No. 4, 1999, at
35 (in Chinese).
91. Feng Qihua, Judicial Transparency, CHINA DAILY, June 28, 2000. See also Supreme People's Court Publicises
Its Adjudicating Documents to the Public Forum Today, June 19, 2000, available at http://www.court.gov.cn/
channel7/xinwen-l.htm (last visited June 15, 2001).
92. Liu Junhai, supra note 70, at 402.
93. Top Judge Urges Trial Efficiency, XINHUA, Oct. 30, 2000, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/
3306.htn (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
94. Tong Ji & Wang Liwen, How to Further Raise the Adjudicating Efficiency from the Pace of Court's Case
Handling, PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE, No. 5, 1999, at 19 (in Chinese).
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on a case after a legal proceeding. In addition, when a case is considered complicated or
important, the judicial committee rather than the collegial panel may make the final deci-
sion. This mechanism is said to safeguard the correct and impartial exercise of judicial
powers, but in practice some committee members to interfere improperly with the collegial
panel's function and to provide favours to one side of the litigation may also use it as a
device. 91 This mechanism of separating the trial process from the decision-making is clearly
a deficiency in China's judicial system. For that reason, it is advocated that, "the respon-
sibility for the proper handling of cases should rest with the presiding judge. This will
reduce the need of multiple judges, lower the number of procedural steps, and shorten the
time of litigation, thereby lowering procedural costs and increasing work efficiency."96
How China improves the people's assessors system is relevant to the efficiency and trans-
parency of court work. The people's assessors system was first stipulated in the 1954 Con-
stitution. Though removed from the 1982 Constitution, it still exists in practice. Accord-
ingly, the standing committee of local people's congresses may select people's assessors and
provide a list of them to the courts at the corresponding levels. Courts may select people's
assessors from the list and invite them to participate in the case of first-instance trial. The
collegial panel for a first-instance trial may be composed of judges and people's assessors
or of judges exclusively. The people's assessors system differs from the jury system in com-
mon law jurisdictions in that people's assessors are not selected on the basis of citizenship;
they function as judges, and have the authority to decide both issues of facts and law.
Although this system is praised as a form of judicial democratization and direct involvement
of the ordinary people in judicial activities, there remain a number of problems (for example,
assessors with little legal knowledge, assessors that fail to participate in the legal proceed-
ings, and lack of operative regulations to select assessors). The system may be improved by
providing more precise regulations, particularly on the qualifications and treatment of the
assessors, rights and duties of the assessors, the selection procedure, and the scope of the
system application so that some if not all of the problems can be eliminated.9"
E. WITHDRAWAL SYSTEM
The withdrawal system is an important part of the litigation procedure. It is provided in
the Chinese procedure laws:
If a party to a case considers that a member of the judicial personnel has an interest in the case
or, for any other person, cannot administer justice impartially, he has the right to ask that
member to withdraw. The president of the court shall decide whether the member should
withdraw. If a member of the judicial personnel considers that he should withdraw because he
has an interest in the case or for any other person, he should report the matter to the president
of the court for decision.""'
The term "judicial personnel" in the provision is ambiguous: it can naturally include
judges and other adjudicating persons, but it is not clear whether all the persons assisting
95. See "People's Courts," at http://www.chnlaw.com/LegalForun/Legalsystem/Courts/Courts.htm (last
visited June 29, 2001).
96. Cai Dingjian, supra note 51, at 162.
97. See Sun Jungong, The Status and Improvement of Our People's Assessors System, PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE , No.
9, 1999, at 29-30 (in Chinese).
98. Organic Law of the Court, art. 16.
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in handling the case are included. Second, the provision does not mention whether the
withdrawal system applies to the work of the adjudicating committees. Third, the provision
does not mention whether the president should withdraw from a case in which he may have
an interest. Finally, it does not mention whether it applies to the enforcing personnel of
court judgements. Due to these shortcomings, the improvement of the withdrawal system
is necessary. Some scholars suggest "three opens" in the withdrawal system as a key to its
improvement: (1) open to the public the relevant regulations and rules; (2) open to the
public the resume of the relevant judges; and (3) open to the public the resum6 of the judges
in particular cases. Meanwhile, the existing regulations should be amended. 99 Clearly, China
has realized this necessity. In 2000, two sets of new regulations on the withdrawal system
came out: (1) the Certain Provisions on the Strict Implementation of the Withdrawal Sys-
tem of Adjudicating Personnel; and (2) the Provisional Measures on the Withdrawal of
Office of the Procurators. 50 According to these two regulations, the withdrawal system has
been further improved, and some shortcomings are remedied. For example, a judge or
procurator who has retired from his office for less than two years is not allowed to be a
legal representative or defence counsel.
F. WRONG VERDICT LIABILITY
The "wrong verdict liability" system (zuo an zuijiu zhi) functions as an effective measure
to improve the quality of adjudication as well as to curb judicial corruption. It aims to
punish judicial personnel who infringe substantive or procedural law in the adjudicating
process and make wrong decisions causing harmful consequences. The Supreme Court
issued the Measures on Resignation in Cases of Malpractice by Presidents and Vice-
Presidents of People's Courts at All Local Levels and Special People's Courts in November
2001. The malpractices subject to the new measures include, inter alia, serious misuse of
the law, which incurs huge losses and bad influence; failure to report or investigate cases
of law infringement within the courts; and major accidents caused by the lack of proper
administration. 01
V. Corruption and Supervision
The success of judicial reform also depends on the effective prevention of judicial cor-
ruption and proper judicial supervision. It is widely reported that judicial corruption is the
most corrupt phenomenon in China. Judicial corruption is manifested in the following
respects: (1) judicial localist protection and departmentalist protection; (2) adjudication in
violation of statutory procedures or overdue adjudication; (3) abuse of power to detain
interested parties or lawyers or limit their personal freedom; (4) abuse of judicial power to
extort property, services, or collect fees at random; and (5) breach of the law to protect
99. See Cheng Xiaobing and Wang Yonghe, Thinking of Improving OurJudge Withdrawal System, PEOPLE'S
JUDICATURE, No. 4, 1999, at 31 (in Chinese).
100. NEw LAW MONTHLY, No. 5, 2001, at 21-22 (in Chinese).
101. See Disciplinary Measure to Weed out BadJudges, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 7, 2001. InJune 2001, three judges
at the Huanggu District Court in Shengyang, Liaoning Province, were held liable under this system due to
their wrong decision on a case involving a dog's injury claim. See Three judges were held liable due to their wrong
decision in Shenyang, available at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/shehui/44/20010622/495403.html (last
visitedJune 23, 2001).
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private interests or protection of the interest of relatives or friends at the expenses of the
interests of others.102 Cases involving judges' abuse of power have been frequently revealed
in the mass media. 1 3
In general, corruption sows the seeds for social and political tensions, threatens the very
fabric of society, and undermines the effectiveness of the state and the political legitimacy
of government. The negative impact resulting from judicial corruption on society is more
damaging than corruption in other government agencies due to the nature and functions
of the judiciary. The courts and procuratorates are direct law enforcement organs of the
state in China. Judicial corruption could turn the rule of law to a rule of individuals pursuing
their private interests. It undermines public confidence in judicial organs' ability to imple-
ment laws and regulations, weakens the viability and effectiveness of the legal system, and
finally destabilizes the social order. Furthermore, judicial personnel should be those who
are most familiar with laws. If they break the law for corruption, their misconduct will
definitely give the ordinary people the impression that law is something not important and
serious, or even perceived as equivalent to nothing, leading to the possibility of defiance of
law by the people, thus destroying the authority of the law.
There are a number of factors causing judicial corruption. The factors outside the ju-
diciary are: (1) inconsistency of the current Chinese status with the judicial system provided
by the Chinese Constitution and with the market economy; (2) the negative role the pre-
vious system of planned economy still plays in the current transitional period of economic
system reform; (3) the lack of legal conscience among leaders and the masses at this prelim-
inary stage of building up the rule of law culture; (4) the serious impact of the judiciary's
administrative nature, which leads to non-independence of the judiciary and judges; (5) the
political idea that the judiciary serves politics is still strong; and (6) the lack of institutions
established to monitor the judiciary.
The factors within the judiciary, include: (1) a backward system of judges with poorly
qualified judges, and a lack of personal independence of the judges; (2) complexity of the
court's internal organizations, which limit the display of judges' initiatives; (3) the political
system's negative influence on realizing the functions of the court; (4) the power of per-
sonality subject to the organ of personnel of the local government; (5) the finance of the
court subject to the finance of the local government; (6) lack of discretion of judges, and
adjudication affected by internal and/or external influences in many occasions; (7) heavy
dependence of the judges on the adjudication committee due to the internal disciplinary
system for misjudged cases, thus leading to the low efficiency of case handling; (8) judges'
102. Guo Chunming, supra note 47, at 158.
103. Through the recent "Intensified Educational Rectification Movement" within the judiciary in 1997
and 1998, some 177 courts at provincial, prefectural and county levels have been reshuffled and unqualified
leaders were removed. Nearly 5,000 judges and prosecutors in the first eight months in 1998 were disciplined.
In 1999, 1,886 unqualified prosecutors were transferred, 2,156 officials in 1,062 local procuratorates were laid
off and replaced. In 2001, twenty-two judges in Hainan Province were removed due to their corruption. The
recent major cases include such judicial personnel as: Sun Xiaohong, President of the Higher Court, Yunnan
Province; Cheng Guiqing, President of the Qiaoxi District Court of ZhangJiakou City, Hebei Province; and
Li Yongqing, vice-president of the Intermediate Court of Larsha, Tibet. In May 2000 the intermediate court
of the Hechi Prefecture, Guangxi Autonomous Region rendered eighteen-year and twelve-year prison sen-
tences respectively to Hu Yaoguang, former head of the Luo Chen Prison, and his accomplice Wei Zeguang,
former president of the second tribunal of the intermediate court of the Hechi Prefecture, for their bribery
and malfeasance. This was the first case of judicial corruption handled in Guangxi.
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low salaries; and (9) the serious impact of the judiciaries administrative nature, hampering
the development of judges' work.104 Overcoming of all these factors, particularly the internal
ones, to a large extent, depends on the success of judicial reform.
China has promulgated many laws and regulations regarding the fight against corruption.
However, such anti-corruption laws and regulations may not be effective in the absence of
honest and efficient investigative and judicial bodies. Thus to fight corruption in China is
to first fight judicial corruption. Only when judicial corruption is curbed and greatly re-
duced to a controllable extent can the goal of the overall anti-corruption campaign be
achieved.Il o For that purpose, the judicial bodies have taken a series of measures. In Feb-
ruary 2000, the Supreme People's Court issued the Regulations on Strictly Implementing
the Withdrawal System of the Adjudicating Personnel in order to curb corruption among
judges and maintain judicial justice. The regulations have clarified the meaning of the words
"other relations" between adjudicating persons and litigants contained in the withdrawal
system provided for in the Organic Law of the People's Court, Law of Criminal Procedure,
Law of Civil Procedure and Law of Administrative Procedure. The term "the other rela-
tions" refers to: (1) relative relationship between the adjudicating person and litigant agent
or defendant of the case; (2) private meeting of the adjudicating person with plaintiffs,
defendants or their lawyers without the court's permission; (3) accepting money or gifts
from litigants, or attending banquets and other activities sponsored by them; (5) recom-
mending lawyers or referring cases to lawyers; and (6) borrowing money, vehicles, or com-
munications equipment from litigants, or accepting financial support when shopping for or
decorating houses. For any circumstance above, the adjudicating person should withdraw
himself from handling the case. 06 The Supreme Court has established various internal
regulations regarding reporting of judges' violation of laws or disciplines, disciplinary pun-
ishment on adjudicating personnel for misjudgement, and adjudicating inspection.",7
Supervising judicial functions is regarded as one of the measures necessary to curb judicial
corruption and improve judicial justice. Supervision may come from various sources, such
as the mass media, the CCP and other democratic parties, the masses (such as letters of
accusation), the procuratorate, which is the statutory organ for supervising the work of the
court, and the superior court. The people's congresses may have the power to supervise
the work of the court and the procuratorate. There are some successful supervision cases
reported in the mass media. On August 30, 2000, the Standing Committee of the People's
Congress of Hefei City, Anhui Province passed a resolution on the case of Wang Renchai
(who was wrongly charged of assault and sentenced under custody for six months) de-
manding the investigation of the responsible persons involved in the case and asking the
city government, the intermediate court, and the city procuratorate to report to the People's
Congress the result of the investigation and handling. 10 Another case occurred in Shang-
104. Guo Chunming, supra note 47, at 158.
105. See Zou Keyuan, Judicial Reform Versus Judicial Corruption: Recent Developments in China, 11(3) CRIMINAL
LAW FORUM 323, 351 (2001).
106. See PEOPLE'S DAILY, Feb. 1, 2000 (in Chinese); China Tightens Rules for Judges, THE STRAITS TIMES,
Feb. 2,2000.
107. See Xiao Yang, Firmly Eliminate Corruption among Judicial Personnel and Work Hard to Maintain Judicial
Justice-Report on Carying out Centralised Education and Rectification among People's Courts, GAZE'r-rE OF THE
STANDING COMMImrEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (in Chinese),
1999, No. 1, at 13.
. 108. See MaintainingJudicialJustice, PEOPLE'S DAILY, OCt. 18, 2000, at 9 (in Chinese).
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dong Province: three peasants were sentenced to imprisonment of twelve and fourteen years
due to their charges in a 1996 robbery. After being incarcerated, they appealed many times.
In December 1999, the Standing Committee of the Provincial People's Congress received
the letter of appeal and found many doubts on the case. In December 2000, the People's
Congress sent a Notice of Supervising Individual Case, asking the Provincial Court to retry
the case. On December 29, 2000, the Provincial Higher People's Court declared the in-
nocence of these three inmates and released them. 109 Appropriate supervision can no doubt
facilitate judicial justice and fairness.
There is a regular reporting system between the People's Congress and the court. It is
reported that for the first time in Chinese history the work report of a court addressed to
the People's Congress was rejected. In February 2001, the Work Report of the People's
Intermediate Court of Shenyang (capital city of Liaoning Province) was rejected by the
Shenyang People's Congress. It was hailed as "a benchmark event in China's democratic
politics." l The Work Report was finally adopted six months later, after revision. The
rejection by the People's Congress is an indication of the exercise of supervisory power by
the people's representatives in the congress. On the other hand, it raised a number of legal
issues such as under what circumstances a work report of a court should be rejected, how
to revise rejected reports, and by what means. For the purpose of solving such issues, it is
called to enact the law on supervision.I'
The law on supervision of important and egregious cases under the judiciary was drafted
in 1999 and is now still under review in the NPC. The draft law grants the right of super-
vision to the people's congress over the important and egregious cases of the judiciary in
three aspects: (1) judgements with mistakes; (2) cases far beyond the prescribed time limit;
and (3) cases involving violation of law or torture by the adjudicating organ or the procur-
atorate.1l 2 While the supervision from the People's Congress is recommended,"' there is
some fear that the normal and independent work of the judiciary could be unreasonably
and excessively interfered with by possible abuse of the supervisory power. In particular
some judges have concerns about this kind of supervision and are worried about whether
the People's Congress would become "a court above the court" affecting judicial indepen-
dence. 14 In addition, some scholars consider supervision by the People's Congress an un-
necessary step of legislative power over the judicial power and a potential threat to the
improvement of the judicial system. The reporting system to the People's Congress is a
barrier against the independence of the judiciary and judges.' In order to avoid possible
109. See MaintainingJudicialJustice, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Feb. 14, 2001, at 12 (in Chinese).
110. See Wang Lijie, Progress in Ruling by Law, BEIJING REVIEW, May 24, 2001, at 18; and Vetoing a Court
Report - Milestone in the Democratic Process, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/7765.htm (last visited
Mar. 2, 2001).
111. See Zhou Qingju et al., Legal Thinking of the Reected Report of the Zhenyang Intermediate Court, OuTLooK
WEEKLY, No. 37, Sept. 10, 2001, 26-27 (in Chinese).
112. See PEOPLE'S DAILY, Aug. 25, 1999, at 3 (in Chinese).
113. For details, see Yu Xiaoqing & Li Yonghong, Necessity and Feasibility of the People's Congress to Supervise
the Individual Cases in the Judiciary, I LEGAL SCIENCE 25-28 (1999) (in Chinese); Cheng Xianqing, Thinking on
the Supervision of Individual Cases, PEOPLE'S DAILY, July 28, 1999, at 9 (in Chinese).
114. See Li Xiuyuan, Rational Thinking of the Phenomena of Judicial Interference, PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE, No.
10, 1999, at 15 (in Chinese). Li is President of the Jiangxi Higher People's Court.
115. Li Fucheng, supra note 4, at 717; Yi Yanyou, A Bibliographical Note on Judicial Reform Studies, 12(6)
PEKING UNIVERjITY L.J., 748 (2000) (in Chinese).
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abuse of the supervisory power, there should be a balance between judicial independence
and judicial supervision. ' 6 It is suggested that the People's Congress should not review
directly any case, or propose and/or decide how to handle any case, or support one party
of the case to resist a valid court decision, or supervise a case under the influence of a
particular individual or group, or pass a resolution to revoke or change the judgement of
the court."1
7
In considering this, the draft law sets forth five principles for the People's Congress to
comply with when it exercises the power of supervision: (1) supervision should be conducted
within the authorization and procedure stipulated in the Constitution and the law;
(2) supervision should be conducted only after the court decision has been made; (3) the
power of supervision should be exercised collectively; (4) the People's Congress should not
exercise the power of adjudication or prosecution, directly handle a case, or interfere with
the normal judicial proceedings; and (5) the judiciary should accept the supervision of the
People's Congress."'
To show its willingness to accept supervision, the Supreme Court has prepared Certain
Opinions on Acceptance by the People's Court of Supervision from the People's Congress
and it's Standing Committee."9 In recent years, supervision over the work of judicial organs
has been further strengthened.
VI. Final Remarks
Judicial reform is actually not new in China. As early as the 1950s, China launched a
judicial reform movement nationwide. It was aimed to "insure the political reliability of
court personnel and to solidify the foundation for 'socialist legality."2S At that time many
of the judges were former judges under the Kuomintang regime whose loyalty was suspect,
though the Communists abolished the old judicial system.' 2 ' As a result, many old judges
were expelled from the judiciary, and some were even put in jail. To fill the vacancies,
communist cadres were brought into judicial work. The judicial reform at that time was
hailed as a victory to consolidate the socialist judicial organ of all levels, to establish com-
munist ideology as guidelines for judicial work, and to have laid a solid foundation for the
People's Democratic Dictatorship. History has shown that the judicial reform in the 1950s
carried a different purpose from the one of the current judicial reform. For the former, due
to the distrust of the old legal system, the communist power had to reform a legal system
that it distrusted to serve its own interest since the judiciary, in the eye of the Communists,
is an important instrument of People's Democratic Dictatorship. Today, China tries to
modernize its judicial system in all aspects to meet present and future needs. It is a process
of quality improvement.
116. See Wang Chengguang, Conflict between Independent Adjudicative Power by the Court under the Law and
the Supervisory Power of the People's Congress over Individual Cases before the Court and Its Mechanism ofAdjustment,
LAW SCIENCE MONTHLY, No. 1, 1999, at 18-24 (in Chinese).
117. See id. at23.
118. See PEOPLE'S DAILY, Aug. 25, 1999, at 3 (in Chinese).
119. See XiaoYang, supra note 107, at 8-9.
120. SHAO-CHUAN LENG,JUSTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA: A SURVEY OF THEJUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE CHINESE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 39 (1967).
121. SeeJAMES P. BRADY, JUSTICE AND POLITICS IN PEOPLE'S CHINA: LEGAL ORDER OR CONTINUING REVO-
LTION? 107 (1982).
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Although judicial reform based on the Reform Programme of the Supreme People's
Court and the Programme of the Supreme People's Procuratorate has begun and also
achieved some progress, it is "a long-term matter" as admitted by the President of the
Supreme People's Court,'22 and there are a number of problems to be resolved. The tasks
at the next stage would be more painstaking, and may be related to political reform as well,
aiming at the judicial independence and the neutrality of the judges. To realize this, in
addition to the check of the CCP's interference, the following four issues need to be re-
solved: (1) judicial localization (scope of court territorial jurisdiction is determined with the
local administrative zoning so that the court becomes part of the local government);
(2) judicial administrationalization (a higher court is the leader of a lower court and lower
courts make decisions based on the instructions from the higher courts); (3) within a court,
there is an administrative hierarchy among the judges and other judicial personnel; and
(4) bureaucratisation of judges (judges are treated as civil servants). Judicial corruption is
another major problem, which should be tackled in the judicial reform.
The success of the overall judicial reform also relies on the necessary reform of the
systems regarding police, lawyers, and notaries, which are not addressed in this paper. It is
recommended that a unified institution of judicial reform be established to coordinate ju-
dicial reform in the different organs.'23 Some scholars even suggest a change of the court's
name without the word "people. '124 In addition, it is also important to reform the sup-
porting legal infrastructure based on other major laws such as the Criminal Procedure Law,
Civil Procedure Law, Administrative Procedure Law, Arbitration Law, State Compensation
Law, Administrative Punishment Law, Lawyer's Law, Police Law, and Law of Prison.
However, the two reform programs try not to touch the issue on how to adjust the power
between the judiciary and the ruling party, the People's Congress, or the government. They
also avoid touching any power adjustment between the judiciary (the court and the pro-
curatorate) and other judicial administrative organs.'25 In July 2001, the Supreme Court set
forth five reform areas for the coming years: (1) to push forward the reform of adjudication
and supervision, to prepare standards for re-trial cases, and to regulate the procedure of
opening and handling re-trial criminal cases; (2) to further improve the system of litigation
evidence; (3) to cooperate with other departments to simplify the criminal procedures;
(4) to experiment the arrangement of separate ranks for law clerks working at courts; and
(5) to experiment the equipment of assistants to judges and the number of judges in some
courts.126
It is clear that the focus of judicial reform at the current stage is on improvement of the
work of the court as well as the quality of the judicial personnel. This indicates that judicial
reform at present is not courageous enough. Its next stage should address seriously the issue
of judicial independence. Any substantial change in the power structure will depend on
122. Zhao Zongwei, People's Congresses to Monitor Court Work, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 26, 1998.
123. See Pan Jianfeng, Looking at the Eristing Problems in Our Judicial Reform from the Angle ofapan's Third
Judicial Reform, CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 2000, No. 8, at 14-17 (in Chinese).
124. See Hu Xiabing, Restructuring the Name of the Court, LAW SCIENCE MONTHLY, No. 8, 2000, 21-22 (in
Chinese).
125. See Gu Peidong, A MACRO-STUDY ON THE JUDICIAL REFORM IN CHINA, 22(3) CASS J. OF L. 12 (in
Chinese), vol. 22 (3), (2000).
126. China's Supreme Court Determines Five Reform Areas, available at http://www.chineseinternetnews.
com.en/node2/node3/node 100/userobject6ai 13020.html (last visited July 30, 2001).
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future political reform. An American legal scholar describes China's legal reform as "a
bird in a cage."'127 It is true as long as legal reform, including judicial reform, is carried on
under the restraint of the CCP leadership. However, the cage would be too small when the
bird has grown up. The bird would finally fly away, just as China's economic reform has
experienced.
127. See Lubman, supra note 63, at 297.
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